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Fifteen essays are contained in this collection, all relating to Heinz Post’s article ’Corre-
spondence, Invariance and Heuristics’ (1971), also reprinted. In this article, written in the
heyday of the post-positivist movement, Post aims at convincing his fellow philosophers
of science to bring the issue of heuristics back to the philosophical stage. Examining
a wealth of theories and models from physics and chemistry of the last three hundred
years, Post extracts several strategies of theory construction of which he considers the
General Correspondence Principle to be the most important. According to this princi-
ple, any acceptable new theory should explain the well-confirmed part of its predecessor.
Later Post states the General Correspondence Principle more precisely and uses it with
what he considers its de facto validity to argue against incommensurability, Kuhn losses1
and relativism. Post himself seems to support (but does not explicitly push) a kind of
convergent realism which is most notably expressed in his credo that science progresses
linearly.
The commenting essays, written by former Ph.D. students and a host of distinguished
visitors of Post’s Department at Chelsea College (a former campus of the University
of London whose unfortunate history during the Thatcher Government is told in the
editors’ introduction), take up Post’s ideas, test them against the historical record, or
develop them further. The essays roughly fall in two groups: The first contains detailed
case studies and focuses especially on the status and the role of the General Correspon-
dence Principle. This group includes papers which carefully investigate the historical or
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1In his authoritative and comprehensive exposition of Kuhn’s philosophy of science, Hoyningen-Huene
(1993) gives the following explication of Kuhn losses:
Kuhn often emphasizes the fact that along with a revolution – and the associated gain in
problem-solving capacity – generally come certain losses. Among these are losses in the
ability to explain certain phenomena whose authenticity continues to be recognized, losses
of scientific problems of the narrowing of the field of research, and, relatedly, increased
specialization and increased difficulty in communicating with outsiders. And so, for Kuhn,
the progress which comes with a revolution appears to have been bought at the price of
a certain recession, albeit one quickly forgotten along with the articles and textbooks in
which the conquered theory, in its historical form, is contained. (p. 260; I deleted two
footnotes with references to Kuhn.)
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contemporary-science record (Brown, Chalmers, Cushing, Franklin, Kamminga, Redhead
and Scerri) and some which analyse episodes from science and its history by relying on
normative background assumptions or other scientific theories (Crawford and Hon). The
second group contains more general philosophical reflections (da Costa & French, Koertge
and Saunders) as well as foundational investigations of topics like quantum mechanics
and the special theory of relativity (Kilmister & Tonkinson and Fine). I cannot do justice
to all of these articles, but will concentrate on those which are related to the issue which
Post himself considered to be the most important of his insightful article: the General
Correspondence Principle (GCP). This will be introduced in the next section.
The papers are well-written, original and furthermore closely related to the practice
of science and hence live up to the programmatic opening statement of Post’s essay:
”Philosophers of science should be concerned with Science; that is, with the activity
of scientists, whether the concern be descriptive, prescriptive, or both” (p. 3)2. It is
worth mentioning that the book does not exclusively examine episodes from physics and
its history, but also contains quite detailed case studies from special sciences such as
biology (paper by Kamminga) and chemistry (paper by Scerri). The editors and authors
of this Festschrift went through a considerable effort to make it a coherent whole. All
contributions refer to Post’s original article, although this sometimes seems a little forced.
Especially the case studies will help readers interested in the topic of theory change
and the relation between successive theories to back up their views by appealing to the
scientific record. These case studies are the strong part of the book; they can be used as
a point of departure for the discussion of a variety of issues in the philosophy of science.
However, a discussion is missing of the question which new or modified view of the relation
between theories could emerge from the collaborative work of all authors. In Section 2, I
shall develop and evaluate such a view on the basis of the articles of the current volume.
I will then go on and investigate in Section 3 how one can philosophically make sense of
this new picture.
1 Post’s General Correspondence Principle
The model for Post’s GCP is the quantum mechanical correspondence principle. This
principle played a crucial role for Bohr and others in the process of constructing the
new quantum mechanics in the 1920s. It was expexted that quantum mechanics would
account, within certain limits, for the well-confirmed phenomena of classical physics. The
quantum mechanical correspondence principle is however somewhat more complicated,
as Radder (1991) has shown. The latter consists of various interrelated parts which I will
however not discuss here. In a first attempt, Post gives the following characterization of
’his’ GCP:
Roughly speaking, this is the requirement that any acceptable new theory L
should account for its predecessor S by ’degenerating’ into that theory under
those conditions under which S has been well confirmed by tests. (p. 16)
2Page citations always refer to the present volume. When quoting Post’s reprinted contribution, the
page number of the original publication can be obtained by adding 212.
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The GCP is claimed to be valid even across scientific revolutions. It presupposes that S
and L “refer (in their statements) to at least some events or facts which are identifiably
the same” (p. 8), or, to use a contemporary phrasing, that S and L share a common
set of phenomena. The domain of L is assumed to be larger than the domain of S and
the account given by L will usually be more precise (or at least not less precise) than
the account of the phenomena given by S. A typical example is the relation between
classical mechanics and the special theory of relativity; the latter theory also correctly
describes particles that have very high velocities and provides a more accurate account
at low velocities than the former.
Post goes on to discuss several possible relations between S and L that range from a
complete reduction (which seems hardly ever to occur in science) to approximate or
inconsistent correspondence, but without explanatory losses (such as the just mentioned
relation between classical mechanics and the special theory of relativity). Other possible
relations between S and L which exhibit losses would count as evidence against the GCP;
Post holds that these relations never occured in the history of science of the last three
hundred years - apart from one exception which will be discussed below.
One of Post’s favorite examples to support the GCP is the periodic system which survived
the quantum mechanical revolution. Post explains:
The periodic system is the basis of inorganic chemistry. This pattern was not
changed when the whole of chemistry was reduced to physics, nor do scientists
ever expect to see an explanation in the realm of chemistry which destroys
this pattern. The chemical atom is no longer strictly an atom, yet whatever
revolutions may occur in fundamental physics, the ordering of chemical atoms
will remain. (p. 25)
Post generalizes this example and maintains that the low-level structure of theories is
particularly stable, while higher and less-confirmed levels are subject to change in the
process of scientific theorizing. The pattern of the atoms remains, although quantum
mechanics replaced the former framework theory. Da Costa and Fench call this the
’Principle of the Absolute Nature of Pragmatic Truth’: “[O]nce a theory has been shown
to be pragmatically true in a certain domain, it remains pragmatically true, within that
domain, for all time” (p. 146). This principle seems, at first sight, to be quite plausible;
but is it correct? Doubts arise once one recalls that Post himself confesses that the
successful part of S may be smaller from the perspective of the new theory L than from
the perspective of S (p. 20). Given this, it is not clear how there can be a ’resistant
kernel’ in the long run which “remains pragmatically true . . . for all time.”
Later Post refines his proposal to also account for theories S and L with a different vo-
cabulary. These vocabularies have to be translated into each other and this translation
T may turn out to be more difficult than a mere one-to-one mapping. Also, a condition
Q on L has to be specified such that the truncated L and S have (perhaps only approx-
imately) the same domain. If the well-confirmed part of S is denoted by S∗ (the extent
of which is only a conjecture at a given time3) the GCP can be conveniently expressed
as S∗ = T (L|Q) - the well-confirmed part of S is identical to the suitably translated part
of L which fulfils the condition Q. If L∗ is the well-confirmed part of L and S∗∗ is the
3Cf. Koertge (1973, 172 f).
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intersection of S∗ and L∗ then the thesis of zero Kuhn losses is that S∗ is identical to S∗∗.
Post claims that the historical record supports this thesis.4
It should be noted, however, that Post’s analysis does not take into account what
Hoyningen-Huene (1993) aptly called the ’loser’s perspective’. From this perspective
there are indeed successes of the old theory which the new theory cannot account for.5
Besides, even from the ’winner’s perspective’ the thesis of zero Kuhn losses may be too
strong, as Saunders concedes in his contribution. Saunders writes that ”Laudan [(1981)]
is right to insist that one can always find some theorem, deduction, conjecture, or explana-
tion that has no precise correlate in the successor theory (what Post calls ’Kuhn-losses’)”
(p. 296). He then goes on, though, to distinguish between significant and insignificant
Kuhn-losses; only the insignificant ones are, of course, ’allowed’. I will come back to this
issue below. Radder (1991) has pointed out another problem for Post’s approach: Not all
equations of L may ’degenerate’ in equations of S; as an example, consider the famous
formula E = m0c
2 for the energy of a particle with rest mass m0. This equation makes
only sense in the special theory of relativity. In the well-known limit of low velocities
(β := v/c→ 0) it remains unaltered; it does, however, not correspond to an equation of
classical mechanics.
According to Post the GCP is both a descriptive and a normative thesis. It is considered
to be a post hoc elimination criterion and theories which do not fulfill it should be, as
Post boldly advises, consigned to the ’wastepaper basket’ (p. 23). Examining cases
from the history of science, Post only spotted one obvious ’counterexample’ to the GCP.
Ironically it is the best theory we have today: Quantum mechanics. This theory cannot
be strictly reduced to classical mechanics (p. 21), and this is a crucial failure which Post
blames on the supposed incompleteness of quantum mechanics (p. 22, 34). Quantum
mechanics therefore does not, for Post, count as a case against the GCP; instead the
fact that quantum mechanics does not fulfil the GCP shows that this theory should not
be accepted or at least that it should not be considered to be the successor of classical
mechanics. It belongs, perhaps, in the wastepaper basket. Other proponents of a GCP,
such as Radder, do not go as far and emphasize the correspondence relations which
hold between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics – and so do Cushing, Fine
and Saunders in their contributions, though in different ways. Their arguments will be
examined in the next section.
Before doing so, another issue needs to be mentioned. So far, the following three theses
are in conflict: (1) Post’s GCP is descriptively correct, (2) the belief in the truth of
quantum mechanics is justified6 and (3) quantum mechanics and classical mechanics
share a common set of phenomena. Rather than rejecting theses (1) or (2) one might
4For a comparison of Post’s GCP with other correspondence principles, such as the ones suggested
by Fadner, Krajewski, Radder, and Zahar see Radder (1991).
5Cf. Hoyningen-Huene (1993), pp. 260-262, and the references to the work of Kuhn cited therein.
6I here follow the useful distinction between acceptance and belief proposed by da Costa and French
in their contribution.
Acceptance differs from factual belief in that the former involves a voluntary act of com-
mitment, whereas the latter does not. It is, however, tied to a representational belief in the
partial truth of what is accepted and the commitment is to the use of the representation or
model concerned. Both inconsistent and strictly false theories may be regarded as partially
true and accepted in this sense. (p. 155)
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doubt - following Cartwright’s lead - thesis (3). Cartwright (1999) argues (though for
other motives) that we have good reasons to believe that there are two disjunct classes
of phenomena; some can be modeled by using the toolbox of quantum mechanics, others
by relying on classical mechanics. There is consequently no quantum mechanical model
of classical phenomena. Contrary to Cartwright, however, Post and, I believe, most
physicists hold the view that quantum mechanics and classical mechanics do share a
common set of phenomena. They assume that quantum mechanics accounts for the
phenomena of classical mechanics in principle; it is merely a matter of computational
complexity to demonstrate this. This might, as Cartwright supposes, be a metaphysical
dream.
Consider the following case: theory S accounts for a set of phenomena. Now, new
phenomena occur, which are similar (in a certain sense) to the phenomena accounted for
by S, but these new phenomena do not belong to the domain of S. What can be done?
One option, which is in accordance with the spirit of the GCP, is to develop a theory L
which accounts for both, i.e. the phenomena already described by S and the new and
so far unexplained phenomena. The other option is to start from scratch and develop a
theory for the new phenomena only. Here is an example from current physics. For almost
fifteen years, theoretical condensed matter physicists have aimed at understanding high-
temperature superconductivity. This is an extraordinarily difficult task and no consensus
has been reached so far even about the ’global’ strategy of research. Some of the theorists
suggest to follow the lead of the theory of conventional superconductors (the so-called
BCS theory) as closely as possible. This would eventually enable a unified treatment of
conventional and non-conventional superconductors. Others propose more revolutionary
models which do not relate to the established BCS theory in a straightforward manner. To
be more precise, these new theories do not ’degenerate’ in the BCS theory at some limit.7
The point I wish to make is that it is not always obvious which theories the GCP can be
applied to at all. Should the revolutionary theories of high-temperature superconductivity
be abandoned? The task to decide on this issue is a matter of scientific research, and it
is often not clear at the outset what the best strategy is.
It is instructive to discuss Franklin’s contribution in this context. Franklin presents a
nice account of the history of alternative gravitational theories which explain the exper-
imentally established violation of CP symmetry in certain quantum systems. The new
suggested force, called the Fifth Force, turns out to be a modification of the Newtonian
law of gravitation which is, at a specific limit, obtained in a ’degeneration’ process from
the Fifth Force. But why should disparate phenomena such as the attraction of the sun
and the earth and symmetry violations at the quantum level be treated by one and the
same theory? Why is this a case that supports the validity of the GCP? This appears, at
first sight, highly mysterious, but the story Franklin tells makes the detailed arguments
of scientists in favour of such a conjecture.
What is the outcome of the discussion so far? First of all, it is not clear when the GCP
is applicable at all. This is demonstrated by my example of quantum mechanics and
the case of high-temperature superconductivity. Secondly, when the GCP is applied, it
often does not hold strictly, as Radder’s example shows. Besides, there are losses from
the loser’s perspective and maybe also losses from the winner’s perspective. Thirdly,
7For details see my (1999b) and (in preparation).
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as a consequence of all this, there is a tension between the practice of actual science
and a normative reading of the GCP. But still: Post rightly remarked that there is a
lot of continuity in scientific theorizing, even across scientific revolutions. The relations
between various theories in the history of science are, however, much more complicated
than the GCP makes us believe. Perhaps there is no single and non-trivial principle which
captures the rich structure and variety of developing scientific theories. This can only be
established empirically. What is needed, therefore, is a careful examination of a lot of
episodes from contemporary science and the history of science on which a meta-induction
can be based. As a first step, it is helpful to highlight various relations which hold
between successive scientific theories. The contributions to the present volume motivate
a list which will be presented in the next section.
2 A Plurality of Correspondence Relations
The contributors of the present volume were invited to test Post’s GCP against the his-
torical and scientific record. At the end of the day, a considerable number of them boldly
conclude that ”Post [. . . ] was right, and Kuhn was wrong” (Saunders, p. 321). Things
are, however, not as simple as I made it out in the previous section. In the development
of scientific theories, continuities as well as discontinuities appear. Hence, the interesting
question to be addressed therefore is: Which elements of S and L correspond to each
other, and which elements do not? Are there general rules that guide practising scientists
in those difficult decision situations? As a prolegomenon to such a task, it is reasonable
to examine more closely how specific scientific theories are related to each other. Which
elements are taken over, what are the motives for doing so and how are the elements of the
old theory made to fit the new theory? Based on the case studies of the current volume
I will address these questions and provide a preliminary and presumably incomplete list
of correspondence relations which may hold between successive theories. Some theories
exhibit more than one of these relations, and some correspondences appear at different
stages of the development of a theory.
A first useful distinction is between ontological and epistemological correspondence rela-
tions. An ontological correspondence relation holds between S and L if some or all of the
entities of S are also entities of L. As Saunders convincingly argued in his contribution,
a host of intriguing problems (such as reference etc.) emerge here; I will therefore follow
Saunders’ implicit advice and consider only epistemological correspondence relations8,
i.e. relations between the theories in question. The following types of epistemological
correspondence relations can be distinguished:
1. Term Correspondence. Here certain terms from S are taken over into L. This is
a standard strategy in the development of scientific theories. In The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions Thomas S. Kuhn writes that “[s]ince new paradigms are born
from old ones, they ordinarily incorporate much of the vocabulary and apparatus,
both conceptual and manipulative, that the traditional paradigm had previously
employed” (Kuhn, 1996, p. 149). Now it is well-known that Kuhn also argues in the
8Saunders suggests to leave reference to Fregean sense (pp. 303, 307) and argues to study only the
relation between the mathematical structure of the theories in question.
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very same book that this continuity goes along with meaning variance and problems
of reference. A standard example is the meaning shift from ’mass’ in classical
mechanics to ’mass’ in the special theory of relativity. A disclaimer or two is in order
here. Term correspondence does not imply that all terms of a theory correspond to
terms in the successor theory. Often, only a few key terms are carried over, while
others are left aside and new terms are coined in addition. Also, a correspondence
relation between two theories can be established by a suitable translation of the
respective terms, as Post has also pointed out. Term Correspondence is a rather
minimal requirement; it is presupposed by all other corrrespondence relations to be
discussed below.
2. Numerical Correspondence. Here S and L agree on the numerical values of some
quantities (cf. Radder, 1991, pp. 203-204). Numerical Correspondence therefore
presupposes Term Correspondence. An example discussed by da Costa and French
and Scerri in their contributions is the spectrum of hydrogen in the Bohr model
and in quantum mechanics. Although the assumptions that were made to calculate
the spectrum differ considerably in both theories, they nevertheless lead to the
same numerical values. Again, this is a rather weak kind of a correspondence
relation which is moreover usually realized only approximately (as in the example
just discussed). Its heuristic value is low since the principle can only be applied post
hoc. Obviously, Numerical Correspondence is only interesting in the mathematical
sciences; in large parts of biology and archeology, for example, the requirement of
Numerical Correspondence does not apply.
3. Observational Correspondence. This kind of correspondence relation is introduced
in Fine’s contribution in the context of his interesting resolution of the quantum
mechanical measurement problem. Fine, like Einstein whom he quotes approv-
ingly, does not accept Cushing’s claim that Bohm’s version of quantum mechanics
should have been chosen according to Post’s GCP (p. 262), because the Bohm
theory “did not enable one to retrieve the classical and well-confirmed account of
a ball rebounding elastically between two walls” (p. 280). It therefore does not
fulfil Post’s (and Einstein’s) correspondence principle. Bohm’s theory does, how-
ever, fulfil a weaker form of a correspondence principle. Fine writes: “[W]here the
classical account itself is well-confirmed, the Bohm theory ’degenerates’ into the
classical account of what we are expected to observe under well-defined conditions
of observation” (p. 280). Unfortunately, the standard Copenhagen version of quan-
tum mechanics does not fulfil the principle of Observational Correspondence and
Fine therefore presents his solution of the measurement problem in order to restore
this. Abstracting from quantum mechanics, Observational Correspondence means
that L ’degenerates’ into what we are expected to observe according to S∗ under
well-defined conditions of observation. Observational Correspondence, like Numer-
ical Correspondence, presupposes Term Correspondence, but differs from Numerical
Correspondence which may also apply when the quantities in question cannot be
observed. Besides, Observational Correspondence relations can also hold in sciences
which do not represent their content numerically. Observational Correspondence
emphasizes the role of the conditions of observation which are especially important
in the context of quantum mechanics. A heuristic principle based on the demand
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of Observational Correspondence is again only a post hoc selection criterion. It is
of no help in the actual process of constructing new theories. Observational Corre-
spondence alone also does not suffice to provide an explanation for the success of
the old theory. It is therefore weaker than Post’s GCP.
4. Initial or Boundary Condition Correspondence. According to the syntactic view of
scientific theories which most authors of the present volume adopt (a notable ex-
ception are da Costa and French), a theory is a set of axioms (or laws) plus suitable
initial or boundary conditions. Kamminga complains in her contribution that the
philosophical focus (including Post’s) is too much on the axioms (or laws), leav-
ing initial and boundary conditions aside. This is unfortunate, since especially in
the non-formal sciences, Kamminga claims, these conditions play an important role
which is relevant to the issue of inter-theory relations. It turns out that there are
theories which incorporate consequences of their predecessor as an initial or bound-
ary condition. Kamminga, whose examinations of various consecutive theories of
the origin of life are illuminating, sums up her methodological points as follows:
“[I]n the attempt to integrate the original theory T with another theory outside
its domain, some consequence of the latter is incorporated into T as an antecedent
condition, which then places strong constraints on the selection of laws that have
explanatory relevance in the modified theory T ′” (p. 77). This procedure, therefore,
provides a link between the two theories. This way of connecting two theories is,
however, a very loose one. It has some heuristic value, as Kamminga herself claims,
but it should be noted that the assumptions taken over from the predecessor theory
remain unexplained in the successor theory.
5. Law Correspondence. Laws from S also appear in L. This kind of correspon-
dence relation often holds only approximately. An example is the kinetic energy
in classical mechanics and in the special theory of relativity. For low velocities,
TCM = 1/2 mv
2 and TSRT = (m − m0) c2 = 1/2 mv2 · (1 + 3/4 β2 +O (β4)) are
approximately the same. The special theory of relativity reproduces and explains
therefore the successful part of classical mechanics. It is probably this kind of a
correspondence relation which Post had in mind when he suggested his GCP. Law
Correspondence implies Numerical Correspondence and presupposes Term Corre-
spondence the difficulties of which (such as meaning variance etc.) therefore occur
again. Despite all this it is required that the terms in question have the same
operational meaning in S and L (cf. Fadner, 1985, p. 832). In many cases, Law
Correspondence is only a post hoc selection criterion of theory choice. As Radder’s
above-mentioned example demonstrates, it may only hold for some of the laws of
the theories in question.
6. Model Correspondence. This type of a correspondence relation comes in two vari-
ants. (1) A model which belongs to S survives theory change and re-occurs in L.
A typical example is the harmonic oscillator which is widely used in classical me-
chanics, but is also applied in quantum mechanics and in quantum field theory. It
should be noted that models, such as the harmonic oscillator, are not only taken
over by the theory which succeeds the original theory, but also by quite unrelated
theories. This is best seen by pointing to all other theories of physics which employ
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the harmonic oscillator; in fact, it is difficult to find a theory which does not employ
this model! Model Correspondence of this first kind has a considerable heuristic
potential; it is, however, not guaranteed that the new theory explains the success of
the old theory, because the model in question may be embedded in a completely new
framework theory which also affects the overall correspondence relation between S
and L. (2) Post mentions another strategy of theory construction which takes mod-
els seriously: “In this case we adopt a model already available which may initially
have been offered as an arbitrary articulation of the formalism only. [. . . ] It is a case
of borrowing a model of the S-theory which contained features not essential for the
modelling of the S-theory (’neutral analogy’), and assigning physical significance to
such extra features” (p. 29). An example are crystallographic models which were
used already a century before physicists identified the units of the regular lattices
with physical atoms. Sometimes, Post concludes, scientists built “better than they
knew” (p. 30). This example also shows that Model Correspondence of this second
kind may indeed lead to an explanation of the success of the predecessor theory.9
However, the criterion is highly fallible, as Post himself grants.
7. Structure Correspondence. Here the structures of S and L correspond. But what is
a structure, and what does it mean that two structures correspond? In his contribu-
tion, Saunders suggests to use the term ’structure’ only in its precise mathematical
meaning (groups etc.). This unfortunately restricts the application of the corre-
spondence principle to a specific part of physics which Saunders calls ’dynamics’.
Saunders’ own definiton of ’dynamics’ is somewhat unorthodox and not very pre-
cise: “By ’dynamics’ I mean to include statics and kinematics, as well as mechanics
and field theory” (p. 295). Given this mathematical understanding of ’structure’,
it is obvious how to flesh out the idea of a correspondence relation between two
structures; here mathematical concepts such as sub-groups and group contractions
are applied. And indeed, many ’dynamical’ theories can be linked to each other in
this way, as Saunders shows in detail. A typical example is the relation between
the inhomogeneous Lorentz group and the inhomogeneous Galilei group which ’cor-
respond’ in a precise mathematical sense. In examples like this Structure Corre-
spondence works best. An other interesting case, also discussed by Saunders, is
the relation between the theories of Ptolemy and Copernicus. Saunders shows that
“[a]n astronomy based only on epicycles [. . . ] corresponds to an expansion of the
form
∑
i ci exp (iωit) (with the earth chosen as origin)” (p. 299). The mathemati-
cal structure of both theories is (perhaps only approximately) the same. There is
therefore no reason to worry - with Feyerabend, Kuhn, Laudan and the likes - about
the abandonment of the Aristotelian world-view or a wholesale change of paradigm
(p. 298).
Saunders’ large-scale fight against relativism (for Saunders, ’relativism’ is a collec-
tive name for social constructivism, historicist epistemology, linguistic holism and
anti-realism; cf. p. 295 f) appears somewhat cheap; parts of theories where prob-
lems for the idea of correspondence show up are stamped as ’insignificant’ (such as
the ontology of a theory10, but also laws etc.) while only the mathematical struc-
9More on the relation between models and theories can be found in my (1999a).
10Cf. Saunders’ discussion of the ether, p. 299.
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ture of a theory remains, in some sense, stable. But even here things are not that
easy. With respect to the role of gravity, Saunders concedes that he does “not sug-
gest that these things can be completely codified” but goes on to confess that this
strategy “is, and [. . . ] has always been, the essence of the enterprise of dynamics”
(p. 306). Confessions like this are not enough to accept the editors’ judgement that
Saunders provides a “vigorous defence of the cumulative, progressive view of the
history of physics” (p. xxiii). Saunders showed, however, that mathematical struc-
tures of consecutive theories may and often do correspond in a strict mathematical
sense.
It should be noted that it is possible also to talk of structures outside the realm of
(what Saunders calls) dynamics. In their contribution, da Costa and French provide
a flexible framework which allows the comparision of scientific theories with different
structures. Their central idea is to add partial structures to the model-theoretical
account of scientific theories which also cover inconsistent theories the role of which
in the dynamics of theories da Costa and French rightly emphasize (p. 142).
Structural Correspondence does not imply Numerical Correspondence. Often, the
structure is ’too far away’ from the empirical basis of a theory in order to guarantee
continuity at that level (especially in the cases Saunders has in mind). It is therefore
not at all trivial to reproduce the empirical success of the precursor theory once
one has decided to take over parts of the structure of the old theory. Despite this,
Structure Correspondence has a very high heuristic value, especially in the kind of
physics that Redhead discusses in his contribution, viz. the quest for an ultimate
theory. Because of the huge gap between these theories and the world to which
we have empirical access, abstract reasoning, such as symmetry considerations, is
often the only tool which enables scientists to proceed.
Three conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis: First, successive theories can
be related in many ways. Sometimes only Numerical Correspondence holds (approxi-
mately), at other times entire mathematical structures correspond. Hence I suggest that
philosophical issues, such as meaning variance and incommensurability, should first be
discussed ’locally’, i.e. on the basis of concrete case studies that exemplify specific types
of relations between scientific theories (p. 262).
Second, there are continuities and discontinuities in scientific theorizing, although it is not
a priori clear which elements of a theory will survive theory change, and which ones will
have to go. An additional difficulty for correspondence theorists is the notorious problem
of underdetermination which Cushing discusses in his contribution (p. 262). Maybe
there is no unique best choice which elements of successive theories should correspond
and which elements should not correspond with each other.
Third, the philosophical project of a methodology is best described by the picture of a
toolbox. According to this view, methodologists extract - on the basis of a wealth of case
studies - a set of methods and techniques which can tentatively be applied by practicing
scientists in a particular situation. What is in the toolbox may, however, depend on time:
methods, as well as scientific theories and goals may change over time (cf. Cushing, 1998,
p. 368). Good scientists know, of course, already a lot of tricks and methods, and
they also know how to use them flexibly and appropriately. This view of the status of
methodology is a middle ground between two extreme positions. Zahar (1983, pp. 258
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f) defends a rather strong form of a rational heuristics which leaves little room to chance
and other influences, while Popper’s (1972, chapt. 7) evolutionary picture supports the
opposite view: There is no rational heuristics; it is the job of the scientists to make
bold conjectures which then have to ’survive’ empirical tests and rational criticism (cf.
Radder, 1991, pp. 201 f). My conclusion seems, after all, to be similar to Post’s own
view on the role of heuristics which he illustrates with an apt analogy: “The study of the
structure of existing houses may help us in constructing new houses” (p. 5).
3 Rationality, Realism and Coherence
How can one interpret philosophically the prevailing continuity in scientific theorizing?
Even if there is no single principle, such as Post’s GCP, which governs the dynamics of
theory construction, the existence of various correspondence relations between successive
scientific theories cannot be doubted. In “The Social Construction of What?”, Hacking
claims that from now on
future large-scale instability seems quite unlikely. We will witness radical
developments at present unforseen. But what we have may persist, modified
and built upon. The old idea that sciences are cummulative may reign once
more. Between 1962 (when Kuhn published Structure) and the late 1980s,
the problem for philosophers of science was to understand revolution.11 Now
the problem is to understand stability. (Hacking, 1999, p. 85)
Stability, as Hacking uses the term, is closely related to da Costa and French’s ’Principle
of the Absolute Nature of Pragmatic Truth’. The Second Law and Maxwell’s Equations,
for example, “are not going to go away” (ibid.). And neither will many of the theories
and laws discussed in the volume under discussion go away. Hacking’s stability-thesis
(which he owes to Weinberg) is, however, considerably weaker than Post’s GCP. Stability
in Hacking’s sense does not imply progress in theory construction. Cartwright’s dappled
world, for example, is stable in Hacking’s sense, but does not fit Post’s account. As a
result of my previous sections, it is clear that Post’s GCP is too strong and does not hold
empirically in a strict sense. A weaker, though testable and philosophically justifiable
version of a universal correspondence principle, based on the typology and the toolbox
view outlined above, is difficult to formulate. This is why, in the remainder, I therefore
only address the question of how the existence of various correspondence relations between
successive scientific theories can be interpreted. My discussion is partly inspired by the
arguments for the stability-thesis Hacking discusses. These arguments shall be addressed
first.
To begin with, it should be noted that Hacking’s main aim is somewhat different from
mine here. He is concerned with a clarification of the positions put forward in the so-
called science wars. In this controversy, two opposite views can be identified. Roughly
speaking, there are realists (such as Weinberg) and constructionists (such as Pickering).
The realists subscribe to the thesis that the progress of science can be explained by
11This assessment is also Post’s opinion: “From the point of view of present-day [i.e. 1971, S.H.]
philosophy, the fact that there is continuous progress in science is a problem, while the fact that there
are occasional revolutions is not” (p. 25).
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pointing to factors internal to science only, while constructionists emphasize the impact
of factors external to science (i.e. social and cultural factors). I will now investigate
whether the existence of correspondence relations between successive scientific theories
can be justified or explained by means of each of these contrary positions. It turns out
that both accounts meet serious difficulties. I will then suggest a middle ground between
these extreme poles; this account makes use of the epistemological concept of coherence.
The first option, realism, comes in various variants. One of them is convergent realism
which holds that successive theories of ’mature science’ approximate the truth (i.e. the
ultimate or final theory) better and better.12 This presupposes the existence of a measure
of the distance of a given theory from the truth (or at least an ordering relation), which
is a controverial topic despite all the worthwhile work on verisimilitude and truthlikeness,
and conflicts with the many discontinuities that emerged in the developpment of ’mature’
scientific theories, as Laudan (1981) has convincingly demonstrated. But perhaps there
is no ultimate theory, as Redhead speculates in his contribution. It is possible that
the process of constructing ever better theories never ends, because “there are infinitely
many levels of structure that can be unpacked, like an infinitely descending sequence of
Chinese boxes, or to use the more colloquial expression: it is boojums all the way down”
(p. 331). Obviously, Laudan’s critique is relevant here as well. A weaker variant of
convergent realism which seems to be able to handle the problems raised by Laudan and
others is structural realism. According to this position, defended implicitly by Saunders
in his contribution, at least the high-level mathematical structures of scientific theories
converge. Continuity on the level of ontology and perhaps even on the level of one
or another law is, however, not required. This might appear to be the result of an
immunization strategy, to use Hans Albert’s apt term, because Saunders calls only those
elements of theories significant of which we have good reasons to assume that they do
in fact correspond. Be this as it may, my discussion in the previous section showed that
there does not seem to be enough empirical evidence for structural realism. Besides, there
are more plausible ways to explain the persistence of certain mathematical structures; I
will come back to this below.13
The second option, constructionism, also comes in various variants. All of them emphasize
the role of factors external to science. In the already mentioned section on stability,
Hacking quotes the historian of science Norton Wise who argues that culture and science
are inseparably connected with each other. Cultural influences go into the discovery of
scientific theories and leave an indelible footprint there. Weinberg, whom Hacking quotes
approvingly, maintains, however, that these influences “have been refined away” (Hacking,
1999, p. 86). Koertge, in her contribution, makes a similar point (in a decision-theoretical
context) with respect to the influence of ideologies on scientific theories. What about the
remarkable stability of scientific theories? Is there a viable constructionist explanation for
this? Following roughly Kuhnian lines of thought, one could state that scientists grow up
and get trained in a certain research tradition, they learn all the theories and techniques
of this tradition and, of course, they want to promote their career; these scientists are
well-advised to demonstrate their affiliation to the tradition in question by following the
12Post also seems to support this view: “Contrary to Kuhn, I belief that scientific theory converges
towards a unique truth” (p. 28).
13Another realist way put forward to account for the stability of scientific theories is Radder’s (1988;
1991) moderate realism.
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research program of that tradition; all too radical junior-scientists are not protege´ed and
their careers may take a turn for the worse. The scientific community does not reward
disloyal behaviour. Another, and perhaps somewhat more plausible, variant to explain
the continuity in scientific theorizing by external factors is this: It is simply too costly
to start from skratch when confronted with a new problem. Scientists who follow this
strategy won’t be able to produce a sufficient number of papers in renowned journals that
are necessary to survive in academia. This also explains why the mathematical structure
of theories is extremely stable: since so much depends on it, a revision would be very
costly indeed. Although there might be some truth to these stories, I think that there is
more to be said.
The third and final option relies on the concept of coherence and takes, in a way, the
best of both worlds. It is weaker than realism (although coherence is compatible with
realism) and leaves enough space for external factors. Here the success of correspondence
considerations in scientific theorizing is explained by showing that this way of conducting
research leads to more coherent belief sets. How can this be achieved? First of all, the
notion of ’coherence’ must be clarified. BonJour explains:
What then is coherence? Intuitively, coherence is a matter of how well a
body of belief “hangs together”: how well its component beliefs fit together,
agree or dovetail with each other, so as to produce an organized, tightly struc-
tured system of beliefs, rather than either a helter-skelter collection or a set of
conflicting subsystems. It is reasonably clear that this “hanging together” de-
pends on the various sorts of inferential, evidential, and explanatory relations
which obtain among the various members of a system of belief, and especially
on the more holistic and systematic of these. (BonJour, 1985, p. 93)
This explication still needs to be made more precise in order for us to be able to compare
the coherence of two different belief sets - say, before and after a scientific revolution.
To assess the coherence of a belief set, a colleague and I have constructed a probabilistic
model that yields a coherence measure (cf. Bovens and Hartmann, 2000). This measure
is a function of the joint probability of the propositions in the belief set, as well as of
the conditional dependencies among these propositions. Stating the joint probability is
a rough and ready way to take into account factors external to science. Factors that are
(mostly) internal to science, such as the “the various sorts of inferential, evidential, and
explanatory relations which obtain among the various members of a system of belief”,
discussed by BonJour, are modeled by means of conditional probability distributions.
Our model accounts for both factors. Additional assumptions are needed in the model to
show that the coherence is higher if the new theory is linked to the old theory through
correspondence relations than if this condition is not fulfilled. Although we have not yet
modeled this claim within our framework, this does seem to be a plausible hypothesis.
Further support comes from Koertge who states that “the fact that a new theory stands
in a correspondence relation to a refuted but largely successful older theory may in some
circumstances confer a degree of prior plausibility on that new theory” (p. 134). This
prior plausibility enters our coherence measure. All this can, of course, only be shown in
detailed models. It should be clear though, that the account just sketched allows for a
rational reconstruction of radical breaks in the history of science: radical breaks turn out
to be necessary in order to render possible more coherent belief sets (cf. Salmon, 1990).
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This is an advantage of the coherence account over the convergent-realism account, but
there is also a disadvantage which Kosso emphasizes in his textbook: “Coherence among
theories will secure a cozy network of cooperation and consistent beliefs, but there is no
obvious reason to think it will secure any anchor to reality” (Kosso, 1992, p. 136). Maybe
we cannot achieve more than an account of nature that is as coherent as possible.14
Science and the dynamics of its theories is much more complicated than Post’s GCP
makes us believe. His principle was only a first approximation, and so were his reasons
to justify the principle. A real understanding of how theories are related can only be
obtained by carefully analysing many detailed case studies. The contributions in this
volume provide a good starting ground for this. The book will therefore be of great
help for all philosophers of science who want to get new vistas on the old (and perhaps
somewhat old-fashioned) problems of theory choice and the relations between scientific
theories. In sum, this is a welcome contribution to the current debate and should be
consulted by everyone who wishes to back up her position by means of examples from
actual scientific practice.
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